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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal arising from an action to determine ownership to rights in water flowing from the Broudth spring in Morgan
County, Utah, and also an action for injunctory relief and for
damages caused by the severance of a pipe stopping water flowing
to a home.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried on'June 20 and 21, 1974, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without a jury.

The only issues tried

at that time related to ownership of the water rights. All issues
as to injunctive relief and damages from cutting the water pipe
were reserved for trial at a later date.
The Court found as to ownership of water rights that after
certain conveyances by the Stephens, the maximum water rights obtained by appellant, John E. Burton, was an irrigation right for
0.34 acres of land and for the domestic requirements of five per-

sons; that the maximum water rights obtained by appellants, Myrtle
Burton and Jack E. Burton, were a stock watering right of 0.139
gallons per minute for the stock watering requirements of six cows
and two horses; and that the respondents, Lee M. Stephens and Gwen
Stephens, retained an irrigation right for 0.502 acres, a domestic right for four persons and also retained a stock watering
right for the equivalent of 22 cattle.
In summary, the Court found, as to water ownership rights to
the Broudth spring, after the two parcels of land were conveyed
from Stephens to Burtons, that the Stephens still retained ownership of 56.6% of the one-half interest in right No. 342 of the
"Weber River Decree" and the appellants Burtons collectively are
the owners of only 43.4% of the onehalf interest in right No. 342.
It is from this finding as to water ownership rights that the appellants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the Court's ruling as to the
ownership of the disputed water rights after the two conveyances
contending that the respondents completely divested themselves, by
warranty deed, of whatever remaining water rights they had in the
Broudth spring.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This dispute involves the ownership rights of the use of waters from a spring in Morgan County known as Broudth spring.

The

water rights in question are evidenced by No. 342, confirmed by
the "Weber River Decree" dated June 2, 1937.
This dispute arose as a consequence of the Stephens1 selling
two parcels of property.

On one parcel was the Stephens' old home.

This parcel, containing .39 acres, was conveyed to John E. and
Sheryn Burton, for which a warranty deed was given on June 15,
1971, without a reservation of any water rights to the Stephens
as grantors.

(R.23)

Contemporaneously with selling their home

to the Burtons, the Stephens also sold some acreage to the south
of their old home to the Barnetts without a reservation of any
water rights.

(Tr. 84), The third parcel, containing 3.16 acres,

was conveyed to Myrtle and Jack E. Burton by warranty deed on
August 20, 1972.

(R. 24)

This deed expressly "included in the

sale is a stockwater right in the present pipeline crossing the
property."

The Stephens, as in the other deeds, failed to re-

serve any water rights.
reserve water rights.

Stephens testified he orally intended to
(Tr. 72, 73) Mr. Stephens owned a total of

17.85 acres prior to the above two conveyances and he later built
a new house just south of the Burtons on part of this original
acreage and in December, 1971, moved into his new home.
65)

(Tr. 57,

The Stephens had drilled a well in connection with building

this new house in order to provide domestic water.

(Tr. 66)

A rough schematic drawing of the Bradt spring and the single
pipeline which served the above properties follows:
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As the drawing indicates, a single pipeline about four feet
below the surface (Tr. 4) runs from the Broudth spring to the Stephens' new home.

In August, 1972, the Stephens permanently hook-

ed themselves up to this pipeline.

(Tr. 67)

On May 27, 1973, Louis Dillree, acting under the direction
of another, severed the pipeline where it crossed the Burton property, thereby depriving the Stephens1 new home of water from the
Broudth spring.

The Stephens then unsuccessfully sought the issu-

ance of an injunction compelling the defendants to replace the
severed pipeline.
The Burtons and defendant Jones justified the severance of
the pipeline by alleging they are the owners of all water rising
in the single pipeline from the Broudth spring across their property.

The Burtons contend they have complete ownership of all

water rights because on June 15, 1971, the Stephens deeded to
the appellant, John E. Burton, all the Stephens1 interest in culinary water from the Broudth spring and also on August 20, 1972,
the Stephens deeded all of their remaining water rights to the appellants, Myrtle Burton and Jack E. Burton.
On the contrary, respondents Stephens contend they still
own a portion of the water rights in Broudth spring even after
the above two conveyances to John Burton on June 15, 1971, and to
Myrtle and Jack E. Burton on August 20, 1972. The trial court
held that the Stephens, after the above conveyances, owned a portion of the water rights to Broudth spring.

The trial court held

the two conveyances had not completely divested the Stephens of
all water rights in the Broudth spring.
such a finding is reversible error.

The appellants contend

POINT I
THE BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER AT THE TIME LAND IS CONVEYED IS
THE CORRECT MEASURE OF WATER RIGHTS.
This appeal involves a question of the ownership of water
rights after certain conveyances of .39 and 3.16 acres of land
from the Stephens to the Burtons.

The correct measure of these

water rights prior to the above two conveyances is the beneficial
use of water at the time of the conveyances.

As statutory author-

ity for such an assertion, appellants cite Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, §73-1-3, which states:
Beneficial use basis of right to u s e . —
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use
of water in this state.
This theme of essential, beneficial use has been reiterated over
and over again in the many water rights decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.

In Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of Rich-

field, 84 Utah 107, 34 P.2d 945 (1934), the court stated:
We have a statute which provides that
"beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state.11 Rev. St. Utah
1933, 100-1-3. Such has been the law in
this jurisdiction ever since the territory
of Utah was organized. This court has in
numerous cases had occasion to apply that
law. Among such cases are Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112; Salt Lake
City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147;
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 569, 164 P. 856; Cleary v.
Daniels, 50 Utah 494, 167 P. 820; Gunnison
Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co.,
52 Utah 347, 174 P. 852; Mt Olivet Cemetery
Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193, 235
P. 8 76; and Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co.
v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 P. 454. IcL_ at
949.
Also see Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274

P. 454 (1929), in which the the Utah Supreme Court said:
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state-11 Laws Utah 1919,
chapter 67, §3.
This is a cardinal principle of the law
of water rights. Id. at 456.
•
The water from Broudth spring, prior to the conveyances by
the Stephens, was used on the 3.16 acres in the following manner
as Jack Burton testified (Tr. 220):
A.
Well, this looked like it was originally a hay barn typical ranch in this area, and
had been modified to include a cattle shelter
and numerous corrals, five, I think. And it
was used as a feedlot. I counted the cattle on
several occasions, and there were in the neighborhood of thirty-five or forty.
Q.
All on this piece of property that you
purchased?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. „. And the size of the mangers and the
shelter, did you formulate an opinion as to how
many cattle this area would accommodate?
A.
I would quess fifty; and it is our intention, of course, to build a herd of this size.
Q.
How long prior to when you purchased
the property did you see thrity-five to forty
head of cattle on it? •
A.
Oh, whenever I happened to be visiting
my boy why I would step out and just peruse, take
a look at the area and see how many were there
-co see if it looked like it would accommodate
what we wanted.
Q.
And was that the number of cattle that
the area would accommodate, was that one of the
prime factors in your determining to buy the
property?
A.
It is strictly a feed yard. I don ! t
think it would sustain a goat otherwise, in an
area like this, you have to buy land when it is
available. We bought the house when it was
available We bought some property, or John
-6-

bought some property, or Woodrow Barnett bought
property south of the house when it was available. We bought the barn when it was available,
and we are still looking for property.
Q.
When you purchased the property and
received the deed, it specifically has provision for water, does it not?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
How much water did you intend that
you would receive with that deed?
A.
time.
Q.

Whatever had been used prior to that
What was the prior use?

A.
It has been stated that there was between sixty and seventy head of cattle or animals kept in that place.
Q.
And you intended to acquire water
enough to take care of that many animals?
A*
Q.
vided? "
A.

Yes.
That's what you thought the deed proYes, sir.

Appellants object to the Court's Finding No. 5 (R. 62).
Since there was no evidence to support the finding concerning
rhe extent of the appurtenancy prior to deeding the 3.16 acres
that related to 6 cows and 2 horses.

The evidence before the

Court was that 60 head of cattle had been watered on this property conveyed to Myrtle and Jack Burton.

(Tr. 220, 96, 83)

There could only be two houses hooked on the waterline flowing from Broudth spring.

Rex Larsen from the State Engineer's

office testified (Tr. 181, 183) that a flow of .03 second feet
is sufficient for only two families.
Q.
All right. Is there anything in
that Brown Decree or anything else that you
' -7-

«*

use as a guide that you refer to that flow
is merely to one home or to two homes, the
total right?
•

,

•

.

'

.

•

•

•

•

A.
The maps show two homes, and the
proposed determination shows eighteen persons , which would be in balance. And there
was large families in those days.
. . .

A*
The only basis we have to go on
is the maps and, of course, the Brown Book;
the maps show two homes and the Brown Book
shows eighteen persons.
Eighteen persons would be the equivalent of two families.
Among those who used the waters flowing from Broudth spring,
it was commonly understood that only two homes could be hooked
on to the line.

Stephens so testified:

i
i
•
I

John Burton testified (Tr. 206) Stephens told him .the line
"to the best of his knowledge was for two houses."

Mr. Waldron

indicated there could only be two houses on the line.

(Tr. 95,

Mr. Jones also understood there could be only two houses

hooked on.

Mr. Stephens testified (Tr. 76):

Q.
Now, Mr. Stephens, when was the
first time that any problems developed between you and any of the Burtons or the
Joneses with respect to your use of the
water from this pipeline?
A.
Generally the — I was told by the
Joneses time and time again that there could
only be two houses hooked on to the line,
whether or not this was the problem or trouble
that you are outlining, maybe it simply preceeded it. But I was told that that was the
case. And I agreed.
-8-

I

(Tr. 115)

A.
I investigated the water for probably two years before I did anything. I
simply didn't hook the water on to the house
because I was told over and over again that
there could be only two houses hooked on to
the, or two houses hooked on to the water
line, I am sorry, so I didn't do anything
to change the system that I had run up to
the house.

113)

i
i
i
i
i

i

Stephens also testified (Tr. 77) there was the problem of
this "two-house thing."
Only two homes, for culinary water, could be hooked onto
this line is evidence that when Stephens sold their home on the
.39 acre parcel that the intent was to convey all remaining culinary water rights from Broudth spring without any reservation.
Such an intent of the parties is also supported by Stephens'
drilling a well to supply his new home with water and the lack
of any reservation of culinary water rights in the warranty deed
conveying the property.
The only parcels irrigated with water from the Broudth spring
were the parcel conveyed by Stephens to Barnett; the .39 acre conveyed by Stephens to John Burton; and the acres conveyed to Jack
and Myrtle Burton.

The irrigation rights appurtenant to the

Barnett property were all conveyed.

The only remaining irriga-

tion rights were appurtenant to the .39 acres and it was the intent of Stephens to convey these irrigation rights.

(Tr. 73)

Q.
Did you intend to convey any of
your irrigation right under the conveyance
marked Exhibit D?
A.
I knew there was a small garden
area back of the home where a little garden was kept, and I intend — I would have
to say honestly that I intended to convey
whatever water went to serve that too.
If there were any irrigation rights remaining, they were conveyed in the deed to Jack and Myrtle Burton.

Thus, whatever irri-

gation rights remained in Broudth spring were conveyed by the Step h e n s . '.'••'-..

After the water pipe was severed, stopping the flow to respondents, respondents made a motion for a temporary injunction.
-9-

A hearing was held July 5, 1974, before Judge John F. Wahlquist.

^

In order to determine whether an injunction should issue, it was

"*

necessary to determine the status of the water rights after the
conveyances by Stephens*

I

Judge Wahlquist found (Tr. of Prelim-

inary Injunction 83,84):
I find as follows:
That the plaintiffs1 predecessors in interest owned the water right which has been
referred to as .03 second feet of flow, and
that this was to water on .17 (1.7) acres of
land to be used for domestic purposes; that
there is no evidence before me on which I
can make a determination of which of the original Waldron landowners would receive water
shares. So for the purpose of this proceeding alone I presume that each was to receive
one half which would be .015 in flow. This
would I find on the testimony of the State Engineer's representative that this would be the
approximate amount of water necessary to support a home with an ordinary family size such
as Barns and gardens and no other waters above
this figure.
Number two, that the plaintiff sold the
house in question to the one defendant and at *
the time he sold the water clearly hooked up
to this water system, and it would be implied
in law a transfer of the water right necessary
for this home; that further the earnest money
contract evidence an intention to sell water
necessary for this home.
I also find there was a discussion involving the sale or exchange of water and necessity for water and also water necessity in
the finishing of the home, and that plaintiff
orally promised to make a quit claim deed to
the purchaser of the home for $17,000.00, to
the water; that so far as I am able to determine the vast majority of the .015 water
right was sold in this transaction; that then
I find that there had been a further sale of
water right to this particular defendant's
father when the barn was sold, when it was
transferred. I believe that this would wipe
out the water right. That there has also
been other sales of water coming off this
which would further diminish the water right.
-10-

I
I
I
I
•
I

I
I
•
I

I
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
|
i

At this time I see no convincing evidence at all in this case that this plaintiff owned any water in this spring. I also
find that there is no evidence of irreparable damage if the water is not turned on
and that he had adequate temporary water
supply. (emphasis added)
In the later decision appealed from, Judge Calvin Gould did
not base his decision on the water usage at the time of the conveyances, but rather his decision was based on the usage after
the two conveyances.

For example, in his Findings of Fact No. 5

(R. 6 2 ) , Judge Gould finds:
5.
The maximum water rights conveyed by plaintiffs to defendants Myrtle Burton and Jack E. Burton under the Warranty
Deed dated August 20, 1972 was a stockwatering right of 0.139 gallons per minute for
the stockwatering requirements of 6 cows and
2 horses.
Such a finding was based on John Burton's testimony (Tr. 37) as
to his usage after the conveyances.
Q.
Can you tell us, Mr. Burton, the
maximum nujnber of stock that your father,
Jack E. Burton, has had on this 3.16 acres
since he owned it?
A.
Well, my dad hasn't actually owned
the stock, I have managed that property for
him.
Q.
acres?

Have you had any stock on the 3.16

A.

Yes.

Q.

Of your own?

A.

Yes.

Q.
What
head of stock,
the 3.16 acres
since you have
A.

have been the maximum number of
livestock, that have been on
since your father owned it, and
been managing it?

Total, or at one time?
-11-

Q.

At one time.

A*

Six head of cattle and three horses.

i

Q.
Six head of cattle. Would they be different or the same as the six head of cattle
that you told us about as being on your .39?

1

sure of the extent of. water rights. Water rights are not pro-

I
I

rated to the total acreage but rather such rights are only appur-

I

A.

They would be the same cattle.

Beneficial use, not the total acreage, is the correct mea-

tenant to land actually watered.

The only part of the total acre-

age owned by the Stephens to which the water had been used beneficially was the Woodrow Barnett property and the two parcels
purchased by the Burtons.

See John Burton's testimony.

(Tr. 217,

218)
Q.
Mr. Burton, did you, at the time you
were negotiating for purchase of the Woodrow
Barnett property, that which you purchased and
that which Jack Burton purchased, did you ever
see any of this water put to any beneficial use
whatsoever other than on those three tracts of
property?
A.

No, I didn't.

The balance of the property not conveyed by the Stephens was
so steep and sagebrush-covered that it had never been watered.
(Tr. 85)

Mr. Stephens testified the balance of the dry hillside

had never been watered.

(Tr. 91) (Inj. Tr. 25, 13)

Stephens also

testified (Tr. 100) that the only land conducive to irrigation
was land at the base of the hill.

The land was so steep Ste-

phens had to make a cut in the hill in order to construct his
new house.

(Tr. 102)

The Stephens retained certain land upon which they built a
new house after the above conveyances.
;

. -12-

The correct measure of

i
i
i
I
•

i
i
i
i

Stephens1 water rights are not the acres retained after the conveyances, but rather the correct measure is the beneficial use
of the water on the .39 and 3.16 parcels of land at the time of
the conveyances to the Burtons.
The water rights were not inseparably attached to the whole
piece of property owned by the Stephens, but rather water rights
are restricted to only the portions to which water had actually
been put to beneficial use.

The Stephens thus retained no water

rights in the steep sagebrush acreage which they retained at the
time of the conveyances.
In the instant case, the question is simply how the water
was used prior to the conveyances.

The only possible measure of

the extent of the water right was the clear use to which respondents had put the water prior to the conveyances to the Burtons.
At the time the conveyances were made, it was clear and visible
to all the parties which land was being benefited.

The water,

prior to the conveyances, was used exclusively on that portion of
respondents' land which was conveyed to the Burtons.

Up to 60

head of cattle were watered on the land that was ultimately conveyed to Myrtle and Jack Burton.

It was with the expectation

that Myrtle and Jack Burton would be able to use the land to, at
least, the same extent as respondents had (Tr. 220) that they purchased the land from respondents.

Beneficial use prior to the

conveyances determines the water rights.

Such prior use was es-

tablished by testimony at trial.
POINT II
THE WATER RIGHTS WHICH WERE BENEFICIALLY USED UPON THE LAND
CONVEYED BY STEPHENS WERE APPURTENANT TO THE LAND.
-13- • .

It is a general principle, well settled in Utah, that water
rights which are appurtenant to the land shall pass with the land
unless expressly reserved.

It must be determined, therefore, whe-

ther the water rights used on the .39 and 3.16 acres were appurtenant to these particular parcels conveyed.

Appurtenance is de-

fined as "a thing belonging to another thing as principal and
which passes as incident to the principal thing."

St. Louis-New

Orleans Nav. Co. v. Hynicka, 36 Ohio App. 94, 172 N.E. 287.
Whether water rights are appurtenant depends

on whether

the rights are an incident necessary to the enjoyment of the land
and whether the rights were used specifically for the benefit of
the land in question.
The Utah Supreme Court in Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93
Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (1937), stated that whether a water right
is appurtenant depends upon usage.
Before Cortella can rely on owhership of a
water right as an appurtenance to his land, he
must first show that such right was an appurtenance, one essential of which is that water
right was in fact used upon said land. Whether
a water right is an appurtenance involves a
question of fact and depends upon the circumstances surrounding each particular case. Id.
at 640 and 641. (emphasis added)
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Zolezzi v. Jackson, 297 P.2d
1081 (Nev. 1956), discussed the question of whether water was
appurtenant to land upon which it was used thus:
11

[T]he very right itself, relating as it
does to the land upon which it is applied, although in a se n s e incorporeal, nevertheless, by
reason of its application, becomes an integral
part of the freehold. The water and the land
to which it is applied become so interrelated
and dependent on each other in order to constitute a valid appropriation that the former
-14-

becomes by reason of necessity appurtenant to
the latter." [Emphasis supplied*] Such would
appear to be the universally recognized law of
waters in the arid western states. Id. at
1082.
(emphasis added)
Also see Big Goose and Beaver Ditch Co. v. Wallop, 382 P.2d 388
(Wyo. 1963), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
In January of 1894, the supreme court in
the case of Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 P.
475, 1025, made a significant decision wherein it was said at 35 P 484:
"* * *a water right becomes appurtenant to the land upon which the water
is used* * * Under our system there
is no such thing as a water right in
gross. The application of the water
to some beneficial purpose is absolutely requisite. And a water right
for purposes of irrigation can no
more exist, where there is no land to
be irrigated, than can an easement for
the passage of light to ancient windows exist where there never were any
windows. And this would seem to be of
the very essence of appurtenances.
Where one thing depends upon another
for its existence, it would seem entirely proper to call it appurtenant
to that thing upon which it so depends."
Id. at 392
Also see Salt River Valley Water Users 1 Ass y n v. Kovacovich, 3
Ariz.App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966), in which the Arizona Court
stated:
Sloser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co.
[7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332], supra; Gould v.
Maricopa Canal Co., 8 Ariz. 429, 76 P.
598; Brockman v. Grand Canal Co. , 8 Ariz.
451, 76 P. 602; Tattersfield v. Putnam, 45
Ariz. 156, 41 P.2d 228; Olsen v. Union Canal & Irr. Co., 58 Ariz. 306, 119 P.2d 569.
The holding in all of these cases is to the
effect that a water right is attached to
the land on which it is beneficially used
and becomes appurtenant thereto, and that
the right is not in any individual or owner of the land. It is in no sence a floating right, nor can the right, once having
attached to a particular piece of land, be
-15-

made to do duty to any other land/ with
certain exceptions, e.g., where the land
is washed away. Id. at 203.
In Thompson v. McKinney, 91 Utah 89, 63 P.2d 1056 (1937), the
Utah Supreme Court defines appurtenant rights by quoting its own
previous decisions thus:
This court gave the following definition in Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake &
Jordan M. & E. Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 P.
731, 736:
"Again, the legal import of the phrase
'appurtenances, rights and privileges,
thereto belonging,1 as is well understood, includes all those appurtenances, etc., which are used in direct
connection with the real estate conveyed. In some instances more, and
in some others less, is thereby conveyed, depending entirely upon what
easements, rights, and privileges are
used in connection with the real estate conveyed.11
(emphasis added) Id.
at 1060.
The two tracts purchased by the Burtons were of little value

I

unless water from Broudth spring was utilized on these tracts of
land.

The two parcels purchased were both arid and unproductive

without water rights.

The reason the Burtons purchased the prop-

erty was to secure the water.

(Tr. 210)

These two tracts of land

were entirely dependent upon the water being beneficially used upon
them and the water was beneficially used upon only these two tracts,
therefore, the water rights were appurtenant to these particular
tracts of land.

Under the evidence before the trier of fact, the

water rights in dispute were appurtenant to the land conveyed.
POINT III
WATER RIGHTS WHICH ARE APPURTENANT TO LAND PASS WHENEVER THE
LAND IS CONVEYED UNLESS THE WATER RIGHTS ARE EXPRESSLY RESERVED.
Water rights have been classified generally as real estate.
-16-

i

The water right itself is treated as an incorporeal hereditament
and is real property.

See Cortella v. Salt Lake City/ supra.

The water rights disputed in the case were appurtenant to the land.
Water rights which are appurtenant as a general principle pass under a deed of conveyance unless expressly reserved.

See 73 Am.Jur.

'2d,' Waters, §242.

V

It is a general principle that water rights
which are appurtenant to land pass under a deed
of conveyance of such land, unless expressly reserved. Thus, in the absence of anything indicating an intention to sever the right to use the
water from the land, a conveyance of land will
pass a water right which is plainly attached to
the land and visibly in use at the time of the
conveyance. The water rights which pass on a
conveyance of land as appurtenant thereto are
not limited to those absolutely necessary to
the enjoyment of the property conveyed; it
is sufficient if full enjoyment of the property cannot be had without them. The incidents which pass as appurtenant must, however,
be "open and visible," from which fact the knowledge of their existence by the grantor is a
natural inference.

The Utah water rights statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, §73-1-11, codifies this principle by providing that an
appurtenant water right passes to the grantee of the land to
which it was appurtenant; but that the water right, or any part
thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in express terms in the
conveyance or it may be separately conveyed.

See Utah Code Anno-

tated, 1953 as amended, §73-1-11:
Appurtenant waters—Use as passing under
conveyance.—A right to the use of water appurtenant :to land shall pass to the grantee
of such land, and, in cases where such right
has been exercised in irrigating different
parcels of land at different times, such
right shall pass to the grantee of any parcel
of land on which such right was exercised next
preceding the time of the execution of any con-17-

veyance thereof; subject, however, in all
cases to payment by the grantee in any such
conveyance of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then due upon any such right; provided,
that any such right to the use of water, or any
part thereof, may be reserved by the grantor
in any such conveyance by making such reservation in express terms in such conveyance, or
it may be seaprately conveyed.
It is well settled case law in Utah that water rights that

1
1
•
I
I

are appurtenant shall pass with the land unless expressly reserv-

I

ed.

i

In Cortella, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Under our statute, section 100-1-11,
R.S. Utah 1933, a conveyance of land pass- '
es an appurtenant water right unless the
same is expressly reserved. This has been
the statutory rule at least as far back as
1888. See Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419,
59 P. 91; Comp. Laws Utah 1888, §2783; R.S.
Utah 1898, §1281. IdL_ at 635.
A deed in statutory form is effective to transfer all appur-

I
•
I
|
I

tenant water rights unless water rights are expressly reserved in
the deed.

Anderson v. Hamson, 50 Utah 149, 167 P. 254 (1917);

also see Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co., 110

•
:

j

Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 (1946), in which the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple
title "together with all the appurtenances,
rights and privileges thereunto belonging,"
by force of Sec. 78-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, unless some rights are reserved by the terms
of the conveyance. Id. at 810.
In Thompson, supra, the mortgagor showed that in several
previous transactions relating to a given tract of land, he had
expressly mentioned the water whenever it was contended that both
the land and the water were included.

He urged that this, plus

the failure to mention water in the mortgage, evidenced an intention to reserve water rights from the effect of the particular
-18-
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mortgage.

The court said that the evidence of such other trans-

actions, all expressly including water, did not constitute sufficient evidence of an intention to reserve the water from the land
mortgaged.

In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence

the Stephens reserved any water rights.
The measure of an appurtenant water right is thus the use
to which it was put.

It is clear from both case law and statu-

tory law that the measure of a right which is appurtenant is the
amount and type of use employed by the grantor at the time of
conveyance.

Which land a water right is appurtenant to is deter-

mined by the property the water was beneficially used upon prior
to the conveyance.

The question in the instant case, therefore,

is how were the two parcels conveyed by the Stephens to the Burtons used prior to being conveyed.

Stephens testified as to

usage (Tr. 96) that:
Q.
I think you have testified earlier
that in connection with that operation you
had between sixty and seventy animals on that
area, at least the area of the barn which Jack
Burton has now at least sometime during that
period, isn't that correct?
A.
Well, yes, on that and other land.
Of course, they weren't confined.
Q.
But in fact the barn and feeding area
is where in fact they fed for the most part,
isn't that true?
A.
Yes, where the feed was supplemented
for them, yes.
Q.
Yes. And so you were aware that
that's what that area was used for, is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

The intention of the parties also determines whether a water
-19-' '-,"'."'

right is appurtenant to the land.

The question of intention is to

be drawn from the deed or if the deeds are silent, as in this case,
to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances, and the acts of
the parties.

The testimony and acts of the parties in the instant

case all indicate an intent to convey all water rights appurtenant
to both parcels.

John Burton testified (Tr. 53, 231, 234) that

Stephens said, "He knew he had no claim to the water, but that he
was not going to disconnect that line."

John Burton also testi-

fied (Tr. 206) that Stephens:
. . .indicated that he was going to drill a
well. And I — h e went on, he expounded, he
said because he couldn't legally hook onto
the spring, that's to the best of his knowledge, it was for two houses- And that he
would have to drill a well for his use.
John Burton also testified (Tr. 211) as follows:

\

Q.
Now, Mr. Burton, after you had acquired your home and Mr. Barnett had acquired the
approximately three acres to the south, and after your father and grandmother had acquired the
approximately three acres on the north, what
water — what was your intention as to what Stephens water you had acquired?
A.
It was my understanding that we had
acquired substantially all of the water.
Q.
Was it your understanding that he had
any water left after those transactions?
A.
No, I didn't think he had any water
left after those transactions.

John Burton testified (Tr. 54) that the reason Stephens drilled a well was "that he didn't have any right to water for his new
home and that is why he was drilling an 8-inch well."

Measured

by both the intention of the parties and the beneficial use of
the water at the time of the conveyances, the water rights were
appurtenant to both parcels conveyed by the Stephens.
-20-

It is the general principal that water rights which are appurtenant to land pass under a deed of covneyance of such land
unless expressly reserved.

See Black v. Johanson, 81 Utah 410,

18 P.2d 901 (1933), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that a deed to land in statutory form
without reservation of the water conveys whatever right the grantor has to the water appurtenant to the land. Anderson v. Harrison,
50 Utah 151, 167 P. 254. Id^ at 902.
The respondents, to determine the water rights, look first
to the decree (Tr. 76), however, the Weber River Decree Right No.
342 does not determine the water rights between appellants and
respondents.

On the contrary, the documents, determinative of

their respective water rights, are the deed delivered to the
grantee, John Burton, on June 15, 1971, and the other deed of conveyance delivered to grantees, Myrtle and Jack Burton, on August
29, 1972.

As to determining water rights, Utah Code Annotated,

1953 as amended, §73-1-11, is controlling not a water decree.
The appellant, John E. Burton's, title to water rights is
derivative and is derived solely from the warranty deed from
the Stephens dated June 15, 1971.

The appellant's Myrtle and Jack

E. Burton's, water rights is likewise derivative, being derived
solely from the warranty deed from the Stephens which was dated
August 20, 1972.

It is clear from the case and statutory law

cited by appellants that the measure of appurtenant water rights
is the amount of beneficial use at the time of the conveyance.
It is also clear that when the deed is silent as to the reservation of any water rights, it is presumed that the grantor has conveyed all water rights which were appurtenant to the land convey• -21- :' ;; / ';

ed.

Stephens testified he reserved no water rights.

(Tr. 117)

The deed to John and Sheryl Burton as grantees contained no reservation of water rights*

(Tr. 86)

There was never any oral dis-

cussion of the reservation of any water rights by the Stephens.
(Tr. 91)

As to reversation of water rights, Stephens testified

(Tr. 116) thus:
Q.
Let me ask you this, you didn't specficially, in writing, reserve any water rights,
did you?
A.

No, sir.

The respondents attempted to obtain an implied reservation
without dealing with the clear and unambiguous language of the
warranty deeds which are fatally lacking in any reservation language .
The warranty deeds clearly conveyed whatever rights the Stephens had to water appurtenant to the land unless those rights
were expressly reserved.

Stephens failed to reserve any water

rights, therefore, in accordance with both statutory and case law,
all the water rights were coveyed by Stephens to the Burtons.
CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully submit that the judgment should
be reserved and the respondents completely divested of any water
rights.
Respectfully submitted,
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants and
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Jack E. Burton and John E.
Burton
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